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THE CONSTITUTION AND
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY, OR HOW
SO-CALLED CONSERVATIVES
COUNTENANCE GOVERNMENTAL
INTRUSION INTO A PERSON'S PRIVATE
AFFAIRS
MICHAEL P. SENG*

The popular conception of conservatism as embodied in the
political figure of Ronald Reagan is that it aims at getting the government off the backs of the people. While the aim of some libertarians is to dismantle government and leave people free to do their
own thing, it is clearly not the agenda of the Reagan administration
when it comes to questions of personal privacy. Nor is it the agenda
of those judges who fulfill a conservative role on the Supreme
Court.'
In implementing its program to turn America back to "traditional" values, the Reagan administration is willing to rely on more
government and not less government. These conservatives advocate less government involvement in the private economy, thus
leading, for example, to the non-enforcement of anti-trust and conservation laws. These conservatives also advocate less federal government control in state and local affairs resulting in the nonenforcement of civil rights laws. These same conservatives, however, do not wish to get the government out of the lives of private
individuals. Proposed laws prohibiting abortion and permitting
school prayer are examples of governmental measures which would
intrude into the lives of private individuals. Moreover, the Reagan
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School. A.B., J.D., University of Notre Dame. The author would like to thank Michael Booden for his research
assistance.
1. One could endlessly debate the characteristics of a true conservative.
Does the true conservative favor less government or more government? This
paper will not enter that debate. Rather, the term "conservative" is used to
designate those who are politically aligned with Ronald Reagan and those members of the judiciary who are philosophically aligned with Warren Burger and
William Rehnquist. Regardless of how one defines a conservative, one has the
feeling that Ronald Reagan and Warren Burger would be more comfortable
lunching with George III than with Thomas Jefferson or Thomas Paine.
Of those Justices presently on the Supreme Court, Burger, Rehnquist and
O'Connor are the most consistently conservative. Brennan and Marshall are
the most consistently liberal.
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administration's concern with internal and external security has
created pressure for increased governmental surveillance of private
individuals and groups as well as for restrictions which would limit
2
the access of the press and the public to governmental information.
The program of the Reagan administration is supported by
those conservatives on the Supreme Court who would limit or overrule the decisions permitting a woman to choose whether to give
birth to a child 3 and permit more interaction between religion and
government. 4 These conservatives would also rewrite the fourth
amendment and other clauses which prevent law enforcement officials from intruding into the private lives of individuals. 5 Additionally, these justices would allow the government to curtail the
public's access to unclassified government information. 6 Given the
Reagan agenda and an increasingly conservative Court, the presently ill-defined right to information privacy is unlikely to be given
7
further constitutional protection in the near future.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION FOR A RIGHT TO
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY

The term "privacy" does not appear in the United States Constitution. Justice Brandeis defined the right to privacy as "the right
to be let alone." Justice Brennan adopted a broad humanistic ap2. Sheinfeld, Washington v. The Right to Know, NATION, April 13, 1985 at
426; Shattuck, Cutting Back on Freedom by Fiat,NATION, June 11, 1983, at 719;
Peterzell, Unleashing the Dogs of McCarthyism, NATION, January 17, 1981, at
33. The Reagan administration has instituted a program to monitor the long
distance telephone calls of federal employees, including calls to the news media,
congressional offices, and public interest groups. New York Times, April 13,
1985, at 7, col.3. Recently, a federal district judge ruled that the Reagan administration committed an unwarranted invasion of privacy when it ordered a full
FBI security investigation of two civil rights attorneys in the Department of
Education. New York Times, April 4, 1985, at 13, col. 5.
3. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 463 U.S.
416 (1983) (O'Connor J., joined by White & Rehnquist J.J., dissenting).
4. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (White, J., joined by
Burger C.J., & Rehnquist J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam, Stevens, J. joined by Brennan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
7. It is quite appropriate that the Reagan administration received its landslide re-election in "1984." See G. ORWELL, 1984 (1939).
8. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas relied on the right to be let alone in his dissenting opinion
in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), where the majority
upheld an opinion of the Public Utilities Commission for the District of Columbia allowing sound amplification devices to broadcast radio programs on city
streetcars and buses.
The case comes down to the meaning of "liberty" as used in the Fifth
Amendment. Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as
well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed
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proach to privacy in his dissent in Paul v. Davis, arguing that one of
the Supreme Court's "most important roles is to provide a formidable bulwark against governmental violation of the constitutional
safeguards securing in our free society the legitimate expectations
of every person to innate human dignity and sense of worth."9
Nonetheless, the concept of privacy is not new. As Professor
Alan Westin observed, "the notion put forward by legal commentators from Brandeis down to the present that privacy was somewhat
a 'modern' legal right which began to take form only in the late
nineteenth century is simply bad history and bad law." Professor
Westin also noted that pre-Civil War America had its own set of
rules which effectively protected individual and group privacy from
oppressive governmental interference.10
In Griswold v. Connecticut," Justice Douglas outlined the various zones of privacy protected in the Bill of Rights:
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is [an emination of privacy]. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy.
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
the beginning of all freedom. Part of our claims to privacy is in the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.
It gives the guarantee that a man's home is his castle beyond invasion
either by inquisitive or by officious people. A man loses that privacy of
course when he goes upon the streets or enters public places. But even in
his activities outside the home he has immunities from controls bearing on
privacy. He may not be compelled against his will to attend a religious service; he may not be forced to make an affirmation or observe a ritual that
violates his scruples; he may not be made to accept one religious, political,
or philosophical creed as against another. Freedom of religion and freedom
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment give more than the privilege
to worship, to write, to speak as one chooses; they give freedom not to do
nor to act as the government chooses. The First Amendment in its respect
for the conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses, to believe what one wishes are important
aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.
Id. at 467-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas's dissent was cited with
approval by the Supreme Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298, 302 (1974), which upheld a ban on political advertising in city buses.
9. 424 U.S. 693, 734 (1976). The Constitution only protects the right of privacy against governmental action. Cf. Blum v. Yaretsky; 457 U.S. 991 (1982);
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Thus, as
Justice Stewart stated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967): "mhe protection of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to
the law of the individual States." Id. at 350-51.
10. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 337 (1967).
11. Id. 479, 484 (1965).
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which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
The Ninth Amendment provides: The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.
Griswold applied the right of privacy to invalidate a state law
which prohibited any person from using contraceptive devices or
from aiding or counseling the use of such devices. The Court noted
that the case concerned a relationship embodied within the zone of
privacy created by fundamental constitutional guarantees. 12
Recently, the Court has tried to distinguish between two different interests protected by its privacy decisions. In Whalen v. Roe, 13
Justice Stevens noted that there is a zone of privacy that involves
"the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"
and another zone of privacy that involves "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." The first
interest has not fared particularly well in recent years due to Justice Rehnquist's implicit repudiation, in his majority opinion in
Paul v. Davis,14 of a long line of Supreme Court precedents. In
Davis, the Court held that the interest in one's reputation is not
given constitutional recognition. The result of Davis, therefore, is
that the majority of recent privacy decisions have involved the second interest: the right to personal autonomy in decision making.
The Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy protects
a woman's autonomy to decide whether to bear a child 15 and it protects the right of parents to make decisions about the education and
rearing of their children. 16 It also protects a right to decide who

12. Id. at 485.
13. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
14. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
15. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court invalidated
Connecticut's anti-contraceptive statute on the ground that it violated the right
of privacy of married couples. The Court later extended this right to single
persons by means of the equal protection clause. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court held that the constitutional right of privacy protected a woman's decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), Justice Holmes upheld a
state law authorizing the forced sterilization of handicapped persons on the dubious ground that "three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. However, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Court invalidated
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act on equal protection grounds
because the act infringed upon "one of the basic civil rights of man." Id. at 541.
16. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (right of parents to determine if children will have access to contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to send children to a
private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach children a
foreign language). Also, in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), the Court upheld the authority of parents to commit their children to state mental
institutions.
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one marries 17 and by implication the right to terminate a marriage.18 In Roberts v. Jaycees, Justice Brennan recently stated that
"choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the
individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme."1 9
Nonetheless, the Court has shown a reluctance to extend the logic
of these decisions to homosexual 20 or adulterous relationships, 21 to
decisions on personal appearance or hair style, 22 to the rights of
pre-trial detainees 23 or institutionalized persons, 24 or to decisions
25
concerning with whom one may live.
An examination of the range of Supreme Court decisions involving so-called privacy interests leads to the conclusion that the
Supreme Court suffers from a severe case of schizophrenia. The
explanation for this schizophrenia is twofold. First, there is the
Court's ambivalence about its "role in a democratic society. ' 26 Justice Brennan's view that the Court's role is to provide a formidable
bulwark against governmental intrusions into the lives of individuals 27 is not shared equally by all members of the Court. Justices
such as Rehnquist are willing to give wider deference to the legisla17. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1974) (invalidating Wisconsin's requirement that certain persons who have an obligation to pay child support get
prior court permission to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia's anti-miscegenation law).
18. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971).
19. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
20. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summary affirmance). This past year the Court divided four to four and thereby affirmed a
lower court's invalidation of an Oklahoma statute which made it unlawful for a
school teacher to even advicate that private homosexual activity be made legal.
Board of Education v. National Gay Task Force, 53 U.S.L.W. 4408 (U.S. March
26, 1985).
21. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (denial of
certiorari).
22. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
23. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (privacy of pretrial detainees does
not require a "one man, one cell" standard and does not prohibit officers from
conducting strip searches).
24. In Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), the Court ducked the issue
whether involuntarily committed mental patients had a constitutional right to
refuse treatment with anti-psychotic drugs.
25. In Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), the Court upheld a village
ordinance prohibiting unrelated persons from living in the same household.
However, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), a sharply divided Court overturned the conviction and jail sentence of a grandmother who
took in her orphaned grandson.
26. The term is used by Justice Powell in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975).
27. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 734 (1976). See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
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ture when individual or minority rights are concerned. 28 This debate is central to the privacy issue because the area necessarily
involves the legitimacy of the doctrine of substantive due process;
specifically, can the Court give substantive protection to rights not
29
explicitly enumerated in the Constitution?
The second area of ambiguity concerns our system of federalism. 30 While the post-Civil War Amendments were clearly aimed
at nationalizing individual rights, 31 the Court has been ambivalent
about these amendments. 32 It is, therefore, entirely consistent with
one aspect of the Reagan agenda for Justice Rehnquist to insist that
individuals must look to state tort law to protect their privacy and
33
not to the fourteenth amendment.
28. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Burger, C.J., joined by
White, Rehnquist & O'Connor, J.J., dissenting); United States R. R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). This deference does not hold when the case
involves the conservative agenda to eliminate affirmative action. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger,C.J., dissenting) or the protection of state rather than individual rights. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985)).

29. See S.

ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

(1980). The Court was particu-

larly articulate about the debate on substantive due process in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas, by relying upon penumbras
emanating from the Bill of Rights, expressly disclaimed any reliance upon the
doctrine of substantive due process as articulated in Lochner v. New York.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. However, Justice Black accused the Court of doing
precisely what it was disclaiming. Id. at 509-10. Justice Goldberg relied explicitly on the language and history of the ninth amendment to demonstrate that
the Court could properly find rights rooted in the "traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people." Id. at 493. However, only Justice Harlan was willing
to rely on the due process clause itself to find that the state had invaded the
privacy of married couples. Id. at 500.
Justice Blackmun premised his majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973), squarely on the fourteenth amendment's due process concept of
personal liberty, as did the plurality in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 499 (1977). Nonetheless, in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1977), Justice Stevens expressly repudiated an approach based on Lochner, as did Justice
Blackmun in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
It should be noted that the conservative wing is not unwilling to act as a
"super-legislature" to expand the rights of the states. Cf. Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 53 U.S.L.W. 4985 (U.S. June 25, 1985); Pennhurst State School
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1984); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005
(1985)).
30. Cf., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
31. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). See H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK,
EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 386-438 (1982).
32. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
33. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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THE RIGHT NOT TO HAVE PERSONAL INFORMATION DISCLOSED
BY THE GOVERNMENT

Two Supreme Court cases gave explicit recognition to the constitutional right not to have personal information disclosed to the
public.34 Yet both of these cases refused to find a violation of that
right in the particular contexts in which the issue was presented to
the Court.
In Whalen v. Roe, 35 the Supreme Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Stevens, considered the constitutionality of a New York
statute which required the state to record in a centralized computer
the names and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs
pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The lower court held that the
statute invaded the doctor-patient relationship protected as a zone
of privacy under the Constitution, and that the state had failed to
demonstrate a sufficient necessity for the invasion.
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, on its face, on the
ground that it did not pose a sufficiently grievous threat to the patient's privacy interests. It noted that there were only three possible ways the compiled information could be disclosed to the public.
First, health department officials could deliberately or negligently
fail to secure the system. Second, the doctor or patient could be
accused of a crime resulting in the data's disclosure in a judicial proceeding. Third, the doctor, patient or pharmacist could voluntarily
reveal the information. The Court noted that the third invasion
could occur with or without the statute and that the first two types
of invasions presented only remote problems. The Court also stated
that disclosures of the information to representatives of the state
having responsibility for the health of the community did not auto36
matically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy.
The Court also rejected an argument that the knowledge that
the information would be readily available in a computerized file
might cause some people such concern that they would decline
needed medication. The Court did state that it was aware of the
threat to privacy posed by the vast accumulation of personal information filed in computerized data banks and government files. It
indicated that the right to collect such data might also be accompanied by a constitutionally rooted duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures, but that it was not necessary to decide the question in that
case because the New York statute evidenced a proper concern for
the individual's privacy interest.
34. Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
35. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
36. Cf. Jaffess v. Secretary, Dept. of HEW, 393 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
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The Whalen decision, therefore, is somewhat ambiguous in regards to the nature of the privacy interest involved and also on the
degree of scrutiny that should be given to governmental invasions
of that interest. The Court referred to the "State's vital interest in
controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs" and held that the
law was a "reasonable exercise of New York's broad police powers." 37 Yet it also stated that the Court could not hold legislation
which has some effect on individual liberty or privacy unconstitutional simply because it "finds it unnecessary, in whole or in
part."38 Nonetheless, in classifying the privacy interest as similar to
the interest involved in the autonomy cases, the Court seemed to
indicate that it would not be entirely deferential to the choices
39
made by the legislature.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Brennan,
again considered the issue of informational privacy in Nixon v. Administratorof General Services. 40 Under the Presidential Records
and Materials Preservation Act, 4 1 the Administrator of General
Services was directed to take custody of Nixon's presidential papers
and sift through them to determine which were private, which were
to be returned to Nixon, and which were of historical value to be
maintained by the government. The director was also ordered to
promulgate regulations to govern public access to the papers.
The Court noted that Nixon had surrendered a large part of his
privacy when he voluntarily entered public life and put himself in
the public spotlight. The Court held that it was premature to consider the issue of public access because no regulations had yet been
promulgated, thus it only considered the invasion which would occur through the screening process. The Court subsequently rejected the argument that screening was analogous to a general
search prohibited by the fourth amendment, holding that the statute was carefully drafted to minimize privacy intrusions and was
"designed to serve important national interests asserted by
Congress."42
37. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
38. Id. at 597.
39. The Court applied the "compelling interest" standard in Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). However, by rejecting the "necessity" standard in Whalen,
the Court indicated that a more deferential standard should be employed. In
recent years the Court has applied an intermediate standard in some cases
which involve important rights but do not involve traditional suspect classes or
fundamental rights. Under intermediate scrutiny the statute must rationally
further a "substantial" governmental interest. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
224 (1982); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). See
generally Note, The Interest in Limiting the Disclosure of Personal Information: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 36 VAND. L. REV. 139, 182 (1983).
40. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
41. 77 U.S.C. § 2107 (1982).
42. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 464.
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The Court carefully considered the objection that the act would
necessarily result in "some intrusion into private communications
unconnected with any legitimate governmental objectives, ' 4 3 but
found that the number of such documents were minimal in relation
to those of public importance. Further, no "less restrictive means"
to segregate the private documents commingled with those of public importance existed. 4" On the related issue of whether sifting
through certain documents of a political character might not violate
Nixon's right of associational privacy and political speech, the Court
found "a compelling need that cannot be met in a less restrictive
way."

45

While both Whalen and Nixon appear to recognize the right to
be free from unlimited disclosure by the government of personal
information, it is not clear what interest must be implicated before
46
the right will apply. Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Paul v. Davis

indicated that it is not just any disclosure of personal information
that will involve a constitutionally protected privacy interest. In
Paul, the Louisville Police Department circulated a flyer to
merchants with the plaintiff's name and picture under the caption:
"Active Shoplifters." The plaintiff had been charged with shoplifting, although his guilt had not been resolved at the time of the circulation. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim for damages under
section 1983, the Court ruled that the interest in one's reputation
alone is not a liberty or property interest recognized in the Constitution, and that there was no privacy interest which prevented the
state from publicizing a record of an official act such as an arrest.
Paul, therefore, seems to hold that no cognizable constitutional
violation exists if the only injury which results from the public disclosure of private information is injury to an individual's reputation. The Court distinguished prior cases which supposedly
recognized one's reputation as a protected interest as actually involving the right to earn a living or to continued government employment, 47 or a right previously held under state law to purchase
43. Id. at 463.
44. Id. at 464.
45. Id. at 467. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Burger, who is normally quite
reluctant to recognize a right to privacy, argued that the law was an unwarranted invasion of the President's privacy interest in both family and political
matters. He argued that the court should use the most exacting scrutiny to
review the legislation and that the burden should be on the government to justify the invasion. Id. at 527.
46. 424 U.S. 693 (i976).
47. Paul, 424 U.S. at 702-06. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976);
Doe v. United States Dept. of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Cf. Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960).
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or obtain liquor. 48
Injury to one's reputation was not alleged in either Whalen or
Nixon. In Whalen, it was alleged that the state's compilation of
data was an unwarranted intrusion into the doctor-patient relationship and affected the individual's right to acquire and use needed
medication. Nixon argued that the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act intruded into two traditional privacy interests of presidents; those areas relating to his decisions, development of policies, appointments, and communications in his role as a
leader of a political party, and those areas relating to purely private
matters involving his family, property, investments, diaries, and intimate conversations. The Court held that Nixon's political activities were recognizable under the first amendment, 49 and
acknowledged a privacy claim in "extremely private communications between him, and among others, his wife, his daughters, his
physician, his lawyer, and clergyman, and his close friends, as well
as personal diary dictabelts and his wife's personal files." 50
III.

THE RIGHT AGAINST DISCLOSURE BALANCED AGAINST THE
FIRST AMENDMENT

Undoubtedly, the right against the disclosure of private information will conflict with the free speech and press provisions of the
first amendment. The first amendment protects both the right to
disseminate and the right to receive information. 51 Clearly, the
public may also claim an important interest in being informed about
private facts concerning certain individuals who may or may not be
public figures.
The difficulty in finding an accommodation between the two
interests, however, is no reason for the courts to refuse to recognize
48. Paul, 424 U.S. at 708 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971)).
49. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 467; see also Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1956) (first amendment guarantees that an addressee of arriving mail not
have to come forward and affirmatively claim documents); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960); (first amendment guarantees freedom of anonymity);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (first amendment guarantees privacy
in one's associations).
50. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 459. In a footnote to his dissenting opinion, Chief
Justice Burger noted that while the Supreme Court had previously refused to
afford constitutional protection to such commercial matters as bank records,
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), or drug prescription
records, Whalen, 429 U.S. 589, these instances only served to emphasize the
importance of truly private papers or communications, such as a personal diary
or family correspondence. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 459. According to Chief Justice
Burger, these private papers lie at the core of first and fourth amendment interests. Id.
51. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1979).
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the right of privacy. The courts will still be faced with finding a
balance between the first amendment, state-created common law
52
privacy interests and privacy interests created by the legislature.
The accommodation reached between those interests would presumably be the same as the accommodation reached between the
constitutional right of privacy and the first amendment.
The Supreme Court has considered the issue in only a few narrowly defined cases. In Time, Inc. v. Hill,53 the Court considered

the application of a New York "right of privacy" statute in relation
to the first amendment. Hill and his family were held hostage by
three escaped convicts in their home. The family was later released
unharmed. A novel and play were subsequently written based on
the incident, both incorrectly depicted that the family was harmed
by the convicts. Life magazine published an article about the play
which gave the impression that the play mirrored the family's experience. The Hills sued for damages under the l&ew York statute on
the ground that Life falsely reported the family's ordeal, and the
Hills were awarded $30,000 in damages. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Brennan, set aside the judgment. The
Court decided that the New York statute could be applied "to redress false reports of matters of public interest" only when the report is published "with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless
disregard of the truth."54 The Court noted that:
We have no doubt that the subject of the Life article, the opening of a
new play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest.
'The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for
the protection of ... [freedom of the press].' Erroneous statement is
no less inevitable in such a case than in the case of comment upon public affairs, and in both, if innocent or merely negligent, . . .' it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing
space' that they 'need ... to survive'

. ...55

52. See Arnolds & Seng, Picketing and Privacy: Can I Patrol on the Street
Where You Live? 4 S. ILL. U.L.J. 463 (1983) (a discussion of the balance between the right to picket and the interest in residential privacy).
53. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
54. Id. at 388.
55. Id. (citations omitted). The Court also stated:
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political
expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy
government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public
view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to
others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community.
The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which

places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. 'Freedom of

discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' 'No
suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaran-
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The Hill case leaves open more questions than it answers. The
case involved a false report about a matter of public interest. The
Court did not address the issue of publishing either a false or a true
report about a more personal matter. In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice Fortas, joined by Justices Warren and Clark, surveyed
the history of the right to privacy and concluded that it was a basic
right which the states could protect. Additionally, when the right
to privacy is invaded by the press "the most careful and sensitive
appraisal of the total impact of the claimed tort upon the congeries
'56
of rights is required.
In Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,57 the father of a rape victim
brought an action against a broadcasting company to recover damages for an invasion of privacy which identified the victim during
television coverage of the rape trial. The Georgia Supreme Court,
in reviewing an order granting summary judgment to the father,
held that the Georgia statute, enacted to protect the right of privacy
of rape victims, did not conflict with the first amendment. The
United States Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice
White, reversed. The Court distinguished Hill as involving the publication of false or misleading information, but expressly left open
the question "whether truthful publication of very private matters
58
unrelated to public affairs could be constitutionally proscribed.
The Court upheld the right of the press to publish information contained in public records, especially judicial records maintained in
connection with a public prosecution which themselves are open to
public inspection. 59
Right of privacy claims conflicted with Congress' informing
teed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and
importance of the ideas seeking expression.' Id. (citations omitted).

56. Hill, 385 U.S. at 415. The impact upon Hill by Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) is still uncertain. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 490 n. 19 (1975); Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 25051 (1974). Gertz held that a private person could recover in a libel action without meeting the New York Times standard of knowledge or reckless disregard
for the truth even if the matter involved an area of general or public interest.
In Dunn & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 53 U.S.L.W. 4866 (U.S. June 25,
1985), the United States Supreme Court balanced the right of privacy against
the first amendment and held that punitive damages could be recovered in an
action for defamation when the defamatory statements did not involve matters
of public concern.
57. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
58. Id. at 491. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell argued that at least in
those cases in which the interests sought to be protected were similar to those
considered in Gertz, truth ought to be recognized as a complete defense. Id. at
500. Justice Douglas maintained his position that the government has no power
to suppress or penalize the publication of "news of the day." Id. at 501 (Douglas,
J., concurring).
59. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (publication of an arrest allowed). But see Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (juvenile records
must be set aside so as not to be available for public disclosure).
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function 60 in Doe v. McMillan.61 A congressional subcommittee
had published a report dealing with the District of Columbia
schools which revealed the names, absence reports, test scores, and
disciplinary records of individual children. The Court, in an opinion by Justice White, held that the congressmen and their staffs
were completely immune from suit under the speech and debate
clause. 62 The Court held that those who printed and distributed the
document, although with congressional authorization, were protected by official immunity only to the extent that their acts served
legitimate legislative functions. The majority expressly avoided deciding whether the plaintiffs had pleaded a valid cause of action or
whether the defendants would have any defense, constitutional or
otherwise, beyond the immunity issue.
In a concurring opinion, Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall did reach the privacy issue. They argued that Congress had
exceeded the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity" because the
publication of the students' names was unnecessary to either Congress' investigatory or informing functions. 63 In a separate opinion,
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued that the
judiciary was engaging in a censorship prohibited by the "Congressional free speech concept embodied in the Speech and Debate
Clause" as well as imposing its judgment in a matter textually committed to the legislative branch of the government. 64 Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Blackmun and Stewart, also expressed concern that the Court's
opinion might adversely affect "public participation in a relatively
'65
open legislative process.
IV.

THE RIGHT AGAINST DISCLOSURE IN THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS

Given the various opinions of the Supreme Court, it is not sur-

prising that the lower federal courts have had trouble delineating
the contours of the constitutional right to be free from unwarranted
governmental disclosures. For example, the Fifth Circuit has up60. HAMILTON, THE POWER
61. 412 U.S. 306 (1973).

TO PROBE (1977) 121-55.

62. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
63. McMillan, 412 U.S. at 330.

64. Although it is regrettable that a person's reputation may be damaged by
the necessities or the mistakes of the legislative process, the very act of determining judicially whether there is substantial evidence to justify the inclusion
of 'actionable' information in a committee report is a censorship that violates
the congressional free speech concept embodied in the Speech and Debate
Clause and is, as well, the imposition of this court's judgment in matters textually committed to the discretion of the Legislative Branch by Art. I of the constitution. Id. at 377 (footnotes omitted).
65. Id. at 341.
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held financial disclosure laws for public officials using an intermediate scrutiny standard. 66 It has also held that Florida law
protected the privacy rights of a man under investigation by state
law enforcement officials. The officials obtained confidences from
him on the condition that they would not reveal the information,
but then later released the personal matter to private insurers who
67
were investigating the same incident.
The Third Circuit relied on a strong public interest to allow the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to subpoena
employee health records of a corporation. The court, recognizing
that the files might contain highly sensitive information which
could fall into the hands of third persons, required that prior notice
be given the employees so they could raise their individual claims to
68
privacy.
The Sixth Circuit, however, has rejected the suggestion that
the Constitution encompasses a general right of nondisclosure of
personal information. It has held that the state can compile social
histories of juveniles and their families and make them available to
over fifty different governmental, social and religious organizations. 69 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has refused to recognize that
health care providers suffer any invasion of a privacy interest when
a state law requires them to release their cost information to the
public.

70

The Fifth and Third Circuits, carefully weighing the interests
on a case by case basis, follow a sensitive approach in dealing with
the issues. Although the Ninth Circuit may have reached the correct result in requiring health care providers to disclose their cost
information, both it and the Sixth Circuit wrongfully refused to recognize any interest in informational privacy. Such nonrecognition
serves a great injustice to our most basic values.
V.

THE RIGHT NOT TO HAVE PERSONAL INFORMATION
COLLECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT

Although it appears that there is a majority on the Supreme
Court that will give some recognition to the right not to have personal information disclosed, there does not seem to be the same
support for a right against the government collecting personal in66. Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 672 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). See also Sevin v. City of New York, 551 F.
Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

67.
68.
69.
70.
1981).

Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981).
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981).
St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
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formation about individuals or groups. In Laird v. Tatum,7 1 the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, affirmed the
dismissal of a suit brought by citizens who claimed that their rights
were being invaded by the Army's alleged surveillance of their lawful and peaceful civilian activities. 72 The district court originally
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to
show any action by the Army that was unlawful in itself and failed
to allege any injury or threats to their rights. The court of appeals
reversed, finding that the surveillance could have a present inhibiting effect on the plaintiffs' first amendment rights.
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that they had sustained, or were immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the government's actions. The
only injury suffered by the plaintiffs according to the Court was
that the executive branch had failed to accept their perception that
the Army's data-gathering system was inappropriate under our
form of government or that the Army might misuse the data at
some future date so as to cause the plaintiffs a direct harm.73 Chief
Justice Burger explicitly stated that the Court was intimating "no
view with respect to the propriety or desirability, from a policy
standpoint, of the challenged activities of the Department of the
Army. ' 74 Nonetheless, from the Court's opinion it is clear that citizens sustain no constitutionally recognized injury when the government merely collects information about their first amendment or
political activities.
In Whalen v. Roe, 75 the Court refused to list the interest to be
free from governmental collection of private information among
the privacy rights protected by the Constitution. In a footnote, the
Court, quoting Professor Kurland, listed three interests protected
by the right to privacy. 76 Professor Kurland originally listed the
right to be free from governmental surveillance and intrusion at the
top of the list, but the Court noted that additional recognition of
this interest was unnecessary because it was directly protected by
the fourth amendment. 7" The Court thus established that governmental surveillance violates the Constitution only when the gov71. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
72. The Army began, in 1967, to collect information on activities thought to
have at least some potential for civil disorder. It stored this information in computers. Most of the information came from Army Intelligence agents who attended public meetings and from data supplied by local law enforcement
agencies. Based upon congressional concern, the Army later reduced some of
its activities and some of the records were destroyed.
73. Laird, 408 U.S. at 13.
74. Id. at 15.
75. 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
76. Kurland, The PrivateI, THE UNIV. OF CHI. MAG. 7, 8 (Autumn 1976).
77. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n. 26.
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ernment commits a search or seizure prohibited by the fourth
amendment.
Originally, the Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment
focused upon whether the government had trespassed upon an individual's property rights.78 Thus, the Court held that governmental
wiretapping did not violate the fourth amendment unless property
had been seized or there was a physical trespass. 79 The Supreme
Court explicitly rejected this approach in Katz v. United States,80
and held that government agents had violated the fourth amendment when they placed a listening device outside a public telephone
booth. Justice Stewart noted that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a per-

son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection . .

.

. But what he

seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.81
In Terry v. Ohio,8 2 the right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions was held to depend upon whether the individual could harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy. Despite the
fact that the Court continues to question in each case whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search is essentially circular because one cannot reasonably have such an expectation unless the Court has recognized the right to be free from
governmental intrusions under the circumstances. Thus, one has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his banking records83 or in
his commercial dealings.8 4 Nor does the Constitution protect one
85
from surveillance by undercover police agents.
The problem of delineating when someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment is well evidenced
86
in the various opinions of the Justices in United States v. Karo,
decided in 1984. The government had inserted a beeper in a
container of chemicals with the consent of the original owner. The
container was then delivered to Karo who had no knowledge of the
beeper. Karo took the container to his home. Agents then tracked
it from Karo's home, to Horton's home, to Horton's father's home,
and then to a commercial storage facility. Thereafter, by means of
78. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
79. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
80. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
81. Id. at 351.
82. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
83. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
84. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
85. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 747 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
86. 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
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the beeper and both visual and video surveillance, agents monitored
the situation until the beeper ended up in a home in Taos where
agents arrested the defendants on charges of possessing cocaine.
Although the government had obtained a warrant to install the
beeper, the lower courts held it to be invalid and suppressed the
evidence obtained from its use. In an opinion written by Justice
White, the Supreme Court held that the installation of the beeper
violated no one's fourth amendment rights because it was installed
with the consent of the original owner and that the subsequent sale
of the container to Karo did not infringe upon his reasonable expectation of privacy.8 7 The Court went on to consider whether the
monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, not open to visual
surveillance, violated the fourth amendment. The Court found that
the use of a beeper in a private residence did violate the fourth
amendment. The government, therefore, must obtain a warrant because even though the beeper is less intrusive than a full-scale
search, it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the prem88
ises that could not have been visually verified.
Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist,
argued that homeowners have no reasonable expectation of privacy
in a container which is brought into their homes with their permission and which is not under their control or ownership.8 9 She analogized this to the situation where a homeowner invites a guest into
his home who is wired with a microphone, which was held not to
violate the fourth amendment in United States v. White.90 Justice
White distinguished the White situation, where a homeowner takes
the risk that a friend will cooperate with the government, from the
situation where the government bugs a friend without the friend's
knowledge or consent. In the former case, one might expect a
friend to reveal a private conversation, but in the latter case, one
has no reasonable expectation that the contents of a private conversation will be revealed without either party's consent.9 1 Justice
Stevens, joined by Brennan and Marshall, argued that by attaching
the beeper to the property the government was asserting "dominion
and control" over the property, which is "a 'seizure' in the most
basic sense of the term." 92 He also argued that the privacy interest
protected was not limited only to the times when the beeper was in
the home, but to all times when the property was concealed from
93
public view.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 3303.
Id. at 3304.
Id. at 3310-11.
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3304 n.4.
Id. at 3315.
Id. at 3316-17.
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Even if one accepted the fact that the "reasonable expectation"
test grants some degree of protection to the right to be free from
unwarranted governmental surveillance and intrusion, the fourth
amendment, as construed by the Supreme Court, offers no protection if the government is not collecting the information directly
from the individual. Hence, a person has no standing to object if the
government collects personal information about him from a third
person or from places or documents over which he has no control
even if the methods used by the government violate fourth amendment standards. 94 Also, while fourth amendment protections are
not narrowly dependent upon the subject being a criminal suspect,
the Court has sustained regulations requiring welfare recipients to
consent to home visits by caseworkers as a condition to public
assistance. Justice Blackmun wrote that such an intrusion is not a
"search" under the fourth amendment. 95 Similarly, while the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination creates a zone of
privacy against government intrusions, as recognized by Justice
Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut,96 this amendment applies only
when the information would tend to implicate the subject in a
crime 97 and does not apply if the evidence is produced by a third
98
party.
The interest of the government in collecting information about
a person's sex life,99 as the FBI did in the case of Martin Luther
King, 10 0 or about lawful first amendment activities engaged in by
individuals and groups, 10 1 or about other intimate aspects of an individual's personality, 10 2 without a showing of some important government interest, clearly runs counter to the proper role of a
94. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979).
95. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
96. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1964).
97. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
98. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974).
99. See Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F.Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
where the court held it was improper for a police department to inquire into an
officer's private sexual activities when the questions had no bearing upon his
job performance. On the other hand, the government may have an important
interest in requiring police officers to disclose the sources of their income and
assets. O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
914 (1977).
100. See A. SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND His TIMES at 361-65 (1978).
101. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F.Supp. 537 (N.D.
Ill. 1982), where the district court approved a consent decree preventing Chicago and the defense department from engaging in spying and harassment of
the plaintiff's lawful political, religious, educational or social activities. Accord,
Handschu v. Special Serv. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
102. In a recent case, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Reagan Administration had acted illegally in ordering full
security investigations of government civil rights lawyers whose jobs do not affect national security. See New York Times, April 4, 1983, at 13, col. 5.
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government in a democratic society. By its refusal to recognize an
independent privacy interest in this area, the Supreme Court is failing to live up to its role as a "formidable bulwark against governmental violation of the constitutional safeguards securing in our
free society the legitimate expectations of every person to innate
03
human dignity and sense of worth.'
VI.

THE RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE STATES

Unlike the Federal Constitution, a small number of state constitutions do explicitly recognize the right to privacy. 10 4 In only a
few of these states, however, have these clauses been interpreted to
103. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 734 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. ALASKA CONST., Art. 1, § 22: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section."
ARIZ. CONST., Art. II, § 8: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
CAL. CONST., Art. 1, § 1: "All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
FLA. CONST., Art. 1, § 23: "Every natural person has the right to be free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to
public records and meetings as provided by law."
HAWAII CONST., Art. 1, § 6: "The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.
The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right."
ILL. CONST., Art. 1, § 6: "The people shall have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable
searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by
eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without probable
cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized."
LA. CONST., Art. 1, § 5: "[Elvery person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose
or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure
conducted in violation of this section shall have standing to raise its illegality in
the appropriate court."
MONT. CONST., Art. 2, § 10: "The right of individual privacy is essential to
the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest."
S.C. CONST., Art. 1, § 10: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to be seized,
and the information to be obtained."
WASH. CONST., Art. 1, § 7: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
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give them any real bite. Although the Illinois Supreme Court initially gave an expansive reading to its constitutional provision protecting privacy, using a "compelling governmental interest"
standard to uphold the Government Ethics Act which required public officials to disclose their business connections and interests,1 05 it
later expressly qualified the right.10 6 The court rejected the argument that the Illinois Constitution restricted the legislative, executive or judicial branches with respect to the disclosure of economic
interests by state officers or employees. It indicated that some
members of the court did not think the provision should be applied
beyond invasions of privacy by eavesdropping devices or other
means of interception.
The Florida Constitution specifically exempts public records
from privacy protection, 10 7 and the Florida Supreme Court has held
that public housing tenants have no right to enjoin a housing authority from allowing access to information provided by them and
by prospective tenants.1 08 The Supreme Court of Montana has
noted that its Constitution, in requiring a showing of a "compelling
state interest" before a disclosure of private information can be
made, affords more protection to privacy than does the Federal
Constitution. 10 9 The court thus held that the state human rights
commission has to handle information it receives from employers in
the course of an investigation so as to minimize invasion of the privacy rights of prospective and current employees who submit information to an employer and expect it to remain private." 0 For
example, job performance evaluations of university presidents
made by the state board of regents cannot be turned over to the
press.'
The Alaska Supreme Court has stated that under its Constitution the level of justification required of the state when it infringes
on the right of privacy depends upon the nature of the privacy interest involved. 1 2 The court used a high level of scrutiny to evaluate a state law which was read to require a physician, who was also
105. Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill.2d 570, 573, 289 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1972).
106. Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill.2d 512, 517-18, 315
N.E.2d 9, 14-15 (1974).
107. See supra note 104.
108. Forsberg v. Housing Auth. of the City of Miami Beach, 455 So.2d 373
(1984). Cf. Doe v. Sarasota-Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So.2d 328 (Fla. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1983).
109. See Montana Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 199 Mont. 434, 649
P.2d 1283 (1982).
110. Id. However, the court has held that one has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his telephone records. Hastetter v. Behan, 196 Mont. 280, 639 P.2d
510 (Mont. 1982).
111. Missoullian v. Board of Regents, - Mont. -, 675 P.2d 962 (Mont. 1984).
112. Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska
1977).
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a member of a school board, to disclose the names of his clients,
holding the law to be inapplicable to him. 113 The court also refused
to enforce a law which required anyone who expended money for or
against a particular ballot proposition to disclose to the public his
name, address, occupation, employer, and the amount of his
14
expenditure.
The decision of the California Supreme Court in White v. Davis11 5 is significant because it focuses upon the right to be free from
governmental surveillance and intrusion rather than merely on the
right not to have private information made public.' 1 6 In White, police officers posed as university students to record class discussions
in order to compile dossiers and intelligence reports on students
and professors who were involved in illegal activities. The court
found the activities of the police violated freedom of speech and assembly and constituted an unwarranted invasion of privacy. It specifically noted that the moving force behind the adoption of the
California constitutional amendment protecting privacy was the
concern "relating to the accelerating encroachment on personal
freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data col117
lection activity in contemporary society."
VII.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY UNDER INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

The United States lags behind the international community in
giving explicit recognition to privacy as a fundamental right.118 Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that
"[N]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his
honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
113. Id.
114. Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1981). The court has held that the
state constitution does not protect taxpayers from having to turn over their financial records to the State Department of Revenue. State Dept. of Revenue v.
Oliver, 636 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1981).

115. 13 Cal.3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
116. White was the first case construing the California Constitution's privacy amendment adopted in 1975. See supra note 104. Prior to the adoption of
the California privacy amendment, however, the California Supreme Court had
struck down, on federal privacy grounds, a law requiring public officials to dis-

close their assets. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal.3d 259, 466 P.2d
255, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970). Subsequently, the California Supreme Court upheld
a narrower statute. County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal.3d 662, 522 P.2d
1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974). Also, the California Supreme Court recognized,
unlike the United States Supreme Court, a privacy right in bank records under
the California constitutional provision against unreasonable searches. Burrows

v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
117. White, 13 Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.

118. See, e.g., McDOUGLAs, LASSWELL & CHEN, HuMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 816 (1980).
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the law against such interference or attacks.""19 Similar protection
is given to the right to privacy (although not explicitly recognizing
the right to reputation) by the European Convention on Human
Rights. 120 The American Convention on Human Rights explicitly
121
protects a person's privacy interest in his honor and dignity.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although the Supreme Court has not closed the door to a right
to informational privacy, its acceptance of the concept has been
somewhat less than enthusiastic. The Court has given limited recognition to the right to be free from governmental disclosure, but
its rejection of an independent interest in one's honor and reputation has made its support of this right somewhat tentative. The
Court's failure to recognize any limits to government surveillance
and data gathering beyond those contained in the fourth amendment is troublesome, especially given the clear intent of the conservatives on the Court to cut back on the protections accorded by
the fourth amendment. 122 Consequently, the right to informational
privacy in the United States may actually lag behind what is articulated by international standards.
119. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (1948). The same language is repeated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 17 (1976). While the United States Supreme Court has invalidated laws
arbitrarily interfering with individual rights to privacy, family, home, and correspondence, it has, unlike the Universal Declaration, refused to recognize any
independent constitutionally protected liberty interest in one's honor or reputation. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
120. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, § 1 (1953). Compare
Klass v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2 EHRR 214 (1978), upholding a German
statute permitting authorities to open and inspect mail and listen to telephone
conversations on the ground that the statute provided an administrative procedure which protected the individual and because the law was "necessary in a
democratic society," with Malone v. United Kingdom, 5 EHRR 384 (1982), invalidating a practice in the United Kingdom of intercepting postal and telephone
communications because of a lack of sufficient safeguards against abuse. For an
informative discussion of European protections afforded against data processing
of personal information, see Hondius, Data Law in Europe, 16 STAN. J. INT'L
LAw 87 (1980).
Patterned on the European Convention, the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria
protects human dignity from degrading or inhuman treatment, art. IV, § 31, and
the "privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations
and telegraphic communication." Although relying on freedom of press rather
than the right to privacy, the Nigerian courts have held that a newsman cannot
be compelled to reveal his sources. Momoh v. Senate of the National Assembly,
[1981] 1 N.C.L.R. 105 (High Court: Lagos); Olushola Oyegbemi v. Attorney General, [1982] 3 N.C.L.R. 895 (High Court: Ikeja). Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972).
121. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 11 (1978).
122. See Wasserstrom, The IncredibleShrinking FourthAmendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).

19851

Informational Privacy and Conservatives

While reliance on state law may provide some protection
against invasions by state and local governments and by private
groups and individuals, it leaves the federal government free from
such restraints. It is the proliferation of federal bureaucracies and
law enforcement schemes that pose perhaps the biggest threat to
privacy interests today. Legislation can provide some protection,
but legislation is always dependent upon the popular will and is unlikely to provide a check if the majority is willing to tolerate an
invasion. This of course means that the privacy rights of minorities
will always be in jeopardy. While Americans are generally concerned about their privacy, 12 3 many people are willing to put up
with some intrusions in order to enforce their own moral standards
124
upon the whole.
Conservatives on the Supreme Court may couch their opinions
in terms of judicial restraint and deference to Congress and the
states, but this is only a camouflage. No matter how they express
themselves they have made a value judgment that the Constitution
provides little or no protection to the individual against governmental intrusions. The conservatives on the Court may not be saying
they like invasions of privacy, but they are in effect giving their
blessing to legislators or bureaucrats who want to intrude into private affairs on one pretext or another. Just as the post-Civil War
Supreme Court proclaimed itself powerless to stop segregation and
thereby ushered in the "Separate but Equal" era, 125 so might the
conservatives on this Court be ushering in an era of "Big Brother."
It is entirely true that recognition of a constitutional right to
information privacy will require the Court to reconcile the right
with freedom of the press and the public's right to know, but this
should not be a deterrent. In fact, this is the reason we have federal
judges whose pay and tenure is protected. It is their job under our
Constitution to make these decisions. Federal judges one way or
another do decide the underlying substantive issues. 126 They either
do so explicitly in a well written opinion which tries to balance or
reconcile the particular values presented, or they do so implicitly
when they duck the issues and talk about judicial restraint and federalism. Whichever way they proceed, the judges do decide and
should be held accountable for the substantive results which flow
therefrom.
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